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Abstract 
This article analyzes how changes made to the revenue sharing agreement in the 2007 Major League 
Baseball collective bargaining agreement influenced the salaries of position players and pitchers. The tax 
rates associated with revenue sharing decreased following ratification of the 2007 agreement. 
Theoretically, these changes should increase players’ marginal revenue product and, therefore, salaries. 
Results indicate that position players experienced an increase in salary following the 2007 agreement. 
Pitchers’ salaries also increased, but by a smaller amount. The effect of the 2007 agreement was 
different throughout the salary distribution for position players, but uniform throughout the distribution 
for pitchers. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
The arena of professional sports is considered the ultimate meritocracy through which productivity is 
the sole determinant of salaries. Throughout history, various institutional forces arose that mitigated 
true productivity-based determination of pay. The unionization among professional athletes, along with 
the increased bargaining power of the athletes’ unions, is one example. The four major professional 
team-based sports in the United States, basketball, football, hockey, and baseball, all have unions 
representing the athletes. Today, representatives of the owners and players’ unions must negotiate any 
changes made to the industrial relations system that might affect the determination of player pay. 
Negotiations for free agency, salary arbitration, and the lack of a salary cap have allowed the free 
market to determine Major League Baseball (MLB) player salaries more than in the other three team-
based sports. 
Revenue and payroll imbalances between MLB teams have increased since the early 1990s (Levin, 
Mitchell, Volcker, & Will, 2000). The growing revenue and payroll inequities have come at a cost of less 
competitive balance between teams. In 1999, Commissioner Allan “Bud” Selig convened the Blue Ribbon 
Panel to study these inequities’ effects on competitive outcomes in MLB.1 The Panel divided teams into 
payroll quartiles, with Quartile 1 containing teams with the highest payrolls and Quartile 4 containing 
teams with the lowest payrolls. The 1995-1999 seasons contained 158 post-season games played. No 
teams from Quartile 3 or 4 won a post-season game during this period. No teams from the bottom two 
quartiles advanced to the World Series. Furthermore, each World Series champion during those five 
seasons was from Quartile 1. The Panel’s report also showed that teams’ payrolls are linked directly to 
revenues, that is, those teams with the highest revenues tend to be the teams with the highest payrolls. 
Therefore, the Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that the growing revenue disparities lead to growing payroll 
disparities, which hurt competitive balance in the league during the mid- to late 1990s. In wake of the 
Panel’s report, negotiations between the owners and the MLB Players Association (MLBPA) resulted in 
changes to the revenue sharing agreement starting with the 2003 season. 
The revenue sharing plan negotiated in the 2003-2006 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) increased 
the marginal tax rates associated with teams’ revenues from the 1997 CBA levels. Owners and players 
agreed to these changes in the hopes of increasing competitive balance on the field. These changes did 
not have the intended effects. The redistribution mechanisms associated with the revenue sharing plan 
resulted in marginal tax rates equaling 40% for high-revenue teams and 47% for low-revenue teams 
(Zimbalist, 2003). Anecdotal evidence suggests some teams lowered their payrolls to hold down costs. 
Doing so resulted in lower attendance and revenues, which increased the funds received through 
revenue sharing. Maxcy (2009) suggests that teams not only divested their player talent but also did not 
compete rigorously in the talent market. This incentive to divest in talent exacerbated the competitive 
inequities. 
To rectify this situation, owners and players agreed to changes to the revenue sharing agreement in the 
CBA covering the 2007-2011 seasons. These changes reduced the marginal tax rate to 31% for all teams 
(Major League Baseball [MLB], 2006). Since representatives of the owners and players’ union agreed to 
these changes to alter team incentives to invest in player talent and increase competitive balance, it is 
reasonable to expect that these changes to the CBA affected players’ salaries. The differing treatments 
found in these MLB CBAs offer an interesting test of labor market theory. The changes in the revenue 
sharing plan amounted to a change in tax rates on marginal revenue and, therefore, the marginal 
revenue product (MRP) of players. The availability of performance and salary data for MLB players allow 
for a comparison between periods to see if clubs altered their valuation of players in any systematic 
manner in the labor market. 
To date, no study has analyzed the effect of these CBA changes on player salaries. The purpose of this 
article is to examine how changes made to the CBA covering the 2007-2011 seasons altered MLB player 
salaries. Using data from the 2003-2011 seasons, this article uses regression analysis to determine 
whether there were changes to the determination of player pay between the pre- and post-2006 period. 
In MLB, there are clear distinctions between pitchers and position players, and previous research has 
shown that uniform regulations within bargaining agreements can have different effects on each group.2 
The analysis estimates salary regressions separately for each group to see if modifications to the 2007 
CBA differentially affected salaries. 
The article proceeds by discussing the institutional background, relevant theory, and earlier literature. 
The third section details the data and empirical methodology, the fourth section presents the results, 
and the fifth section offers conclusions. 
Institutional Considerations, Theory, and Literature 
Some form of revenue sharing has always existed in MLB, and negotiations between owners and MLBPA 
representatives formally introduced it into the CBA covering the 1997-2002 seasons. Under this formal 
revenue sharing agreement, the marginal tax rates for high- and low-revenue teams equaled 20% and 
41%, respectively (Maxcy, 2009). The Blue Ribbon Panel recommended that teams share at least 40%, 
and as much as 50%, of all local revenues less stadium expenses. The provisions in the 2003 CBA called 
for a two-part plan. In the base plan, teams contribute 34% of their net local revenue. The receipts from 
this tax are distributed equally to all teams. Under this redistribution plan, some teams are net 
recipients of funds and some are net payers. Part 2 of the plan was to distribute revenues from a central 
fund. Teams that were net payers in the base plan contributed money to the central fund through a tax. 
However, those teams were ineligible to receive money from the central fund. Only teams that were net 
recipients from the base plan were eligible to receive revenues. The proportion received was based 
upon how far below median league net local revenue the team was. Receipts from the central fund 
increased as teams moved further below the median.3 
The revenue sharing plan resulted in marginal tax rates that equaled approximately 40% for high-
revenue clubs and 47% for low-revenue clubs (Maxcy, 2009; Zimbalist, 2003). Additionally, while teams 
were supposed to use these revenues to enhance payrolls, there was no explicit requirement to do so. 
Critics of the plan note that the tax structure, combined with no requirements to enhance payrolls, 
created an incentive for lower revenue teams not to improve their franchise through player acquisitions 
and instead to use the revenues to increase profitability.4Maxcy (2009) finds that the changes in the 
2003 CBA led to greater payroll disparity and worse competitive balance. Maxcy (2009) further suggests 
that some lower revenue teams divested the talent level of their rosters. 
The 2007 CBA modified the two-part revenue sharing plan. The percentage of net local revenue each 
team was required to contribute under the base plan was lowered from 34% to 31%. The formula for 
allocation to teams from the central fund was changed and based on a performance factor. The 
performance factor was determined from net local revenues from 2005 and 2006 and projected 
revenues from 2007 and 2008. More importantly, the performance factors were fixed and reported in 
the CBA for each team. Any team with a positive performance factor contributed to the central fund, 
and any team with a negative performance factor received funds. Under this approach, a team could be 
a net receiver of funds under the base plan but contribute revenues to the central fund.5 The goal of this 
change to redistribution from the central fund was to correct the disincentives mentioned previously. 
Under the 2007 CBA, a team’s proportion of sharing through the central fund was fixed and did not 
change as revenues fluctuated. This also altered the tax structure of the revenue sharing system. Now, 
all teams faced the same marginal tax rate of 31% (MLB, 2006; Zimbalist, 2006). 
The amount of money transferred between teams through the revenue sharing system grew 
considerably over time. Brown (2010) notes that US$433 million was transferred between clubs in 2009. 
Brown (2009) published a complete list of figures for the 2003 season showing a transfer of 
US$220,350,000 between paying and receiving teams. In 2009 dollars, this equals approximately 
US$256.9 million, which represents a 68.5% increase in revenue sharing transfers between periods. In 
nominal terms, total team revenue in MLB equaled US$3,878 million in 2003 and US$5,898 million in 
2009. After adjusting the 2003 revenue figures to 2009 dollars, this represents a growth of 30.4%. 
Therefore, the growth in transfers was more than double that of total league revenues. Furthermore, 
revenue sharing funds represented approximately 5.7% of overall league revenue in 2003 and 7.3% in 
2009 under the new plan. 
Fort and Quirk (1995) and Rascher (1997) develop a model of sports leagues to examine the effects of 
cross-subsidization measures (salary cap, revenue sharing, and draft) on league profits and competitive 
balance. Fort and Quirk (1995) conclude that enhanced revenue sharing lowers pay by reducing the 
marginal return to teams’ winning percentages. The reduction in the marginal return to a team’s 
winning percentage decreases the incentive for a team to pay the same salary as before. With a 
reduction in the return to winning, salaries throughout the league should be lower. 
Utilizing a variation of Fort and Quirk’s (1995) model, Marburger (1997) finds that increased revenue 
sharing can improve competitive balance but agrees that enhanced revenue sharing reduces player 
salaries. In Marburger’s (1997) model, enhanced revenue sharing reduces player salaries through a 
reduction in the MRP associated with a given stock of talent. Unlike Fort and Quirk (1995), Marburger 
(1997) shows that it is possible for revenue sharing to increase the MRP for smaller market teams and 
decrease it for large market teams. However, the large market team’s reduction will outweigh the 
increase experienced by the smaller market clubs, thereby reducing salaries league-wide. Cavagnac 
(2009) removes the assumption that teams are price takers in the market for players and agrees with 
Marburger (1997) that competitive balance can be improved by increased revenue sharing; Cavagnac’s 
(2009) model finds a decrease in the value of talent at the margin and lower salaries. 
Fort and Quirk (1995), Marburger (1997), and Cavagnac (2009) assume that the team’s objective is to 
maximize profits. Profit maximization leads to teams paying their players a salary equal to their MRP. 
Vrooman (2009) alters the basic model and assumes that owners maximize wins. The author assumes 
that season length and zero profits constrain team owners, which leads to teams paying their players a 
salary equal to their average revenue product. Using this win-maximizing model, Vrooman (2009) 
concludes that increased revenue sharing can improve competitive balance and increase payrolls. The 
author provides some transient evidence suggesting that all four team-based sports leagues in the 
United States are moving toward the win-maximizing assumption. 
Rascher (1997) and Dietl, Grossman, and Lang (2011) develop a utility maximization model for owners in 
which profits and winning enter directly into the objective function. Rascher (1997) shows that under 
the assumption of pure profit maximization, increased revenue sharing leads to lower wages for the 
same reason as Fort and Quirk (1995). When profits and winning enter the objective function, revenue 
sharing’s effect on wages is ambiguous. Teams with relatively low talent levels may bring the wage 
down, while highly talented teams could push the wage higher. On net, however, the author notes that 
revenue sharing’s effect on wages is most likely negative. Dietl et al. (2011) note that if the effect of 
competitive balance on teams’ revenue is sufficiently large, then revenue sharing causes a positive 
impact on player MRP. This increases the investment in player talent and, therefore, salaries. The 
authors label this the “sharpening effect.” The authors do examine the opposite case, the “dulling 
effect,” whereby the contribution of competitive balance to a team’s revenue is sufficiently small to lead 
to revenue sharing reducing a player’s MRP and, therefore, salary. 
Maxcy (2009) is the only article empirically examining MLB’s revenue sharing agreement on competitive 
balance. The author finds that the changes in the 2003 CBA led to greater payroll disparity and worse 
competitive balance. Maxcy (2009) further suggests that some lower revenue teams divested the talent 
level of their rosters. Additionally, Zimbalist (2010) presents some descriptive evidence suggesting that 
the increased marginal tax rates associated with the 2003 CBA may be responsible for the lower share of 
total player compensation as a percentage of league revenues. This empirical evidence supports the 
theoretical conclusions developed by Fort and Quirk (1995), Rascher (1997), Marburger (1997), and 
Cavagnac (2009) and the dulling effect discussed in Dietl et al. (2011). Combined, these empirical and 
theoretical findings suggest that the reduced marginal tax rates and the equalization of marginal tax 
rates across teams in the revenue sharing agreement in the 2007 CBA should increase player salaries by 
increasing net MRP. The simplified theoretical model assuming profit maximization of team owners 
discussed by Maxcy (2009) highlights this. Define MRPi to equal player i’s MRP and define τk to equal the 
marginal tax rate associated with team k as defined in the CBA. In equilibrium, player i’s salary, w, 
should equal the after-tax MRP: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖). (1) 
A reduction in the marginal tax rate should increase net MRP and, therefore, salary. Furthermore, since 
all teams experienced a reduction in the marginal tax rate after 2006, salaries should, on average, 
increase league-wide. 
Maxcy’s (2009) model has additional implications. Define τ to equal the marginal tax rate in 2007. Based 
on Equation 1, player i’s salary in 2007 would equal 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑡𝑡). If Equation 1 represents a 
player’s salary for a given period before 2007, then the percentage change in salary experienced by the 
player would equal: %∆𝑊𝑊 = (𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘−𝑡𝑡)(1−𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘). (2) 
Using the marginal tax rates referenced in Zimbalist (2003) and Maxcy (2009), Equation 2 suggests that a 
player’s salary should increase between 15% and 30%. Furthermore, players on teams subject to higher 
initial marginal tax rates should experience larger wage growth when compared to those players on 
teams subject to smaller initial marginal tax rates. In other words, salary growth may be larger for those 
who play for lower revenue/smaller market teams.6 
Data and Methodology 
The analysis sample includes players on the opening day rosters reported by USA Today from the period 
2003-2011. Teams have a flexible roster size, which ranges from 25 to 40 players. The 25-player roster 
represents the team limit from opening day through the end of August. During this time, however, the 
team can have 40 players signed to major league contracts. Teams assign those not on the 25-player 
rosters to minor league affiliates of the major league franchises. Beginning in September, rosters expand 
from 25 to 40 to allow younger players the opportunity to gain major league experience. This study uses 
data on salaries and statistics of players on the opening day roster to maintain consistency with previous 
research on factors affecting overall pay inequities in MLB (Jewell, McPherson, & Molina, 2004). Data on 
salaries come from the USA Today salaries databases (all dollar amounts have been converted to real 
figures by dividing by the appropriate year’s consumer price index for all urban consumers with 
1982/1984 = 100); player and team statistics come from Doug’s National Basketball Association (NBA) 
and MLB statistics; and data on team revenue come from Rodney Fort’s database.7 
The overall goal of revenue sharing is to increase the competitive balance between teams. The purpose 
of this article is to analyze how this change to the 2007 CBA affected the salaries of players. To this end, 
the analysis estimates salary regressions by ordinary least squares (OLS). The general form of the 
estimated equation is:8 ln𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽1 +𝑧𝑧′ 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽2 +  𝛽𝛽3post − 2006 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇+ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. (3) 
In Equation 3, yit is the real salary of player i in period t, xit is a vector of time-varying player statistics, zit 
is a vector of time-varying team variables, T is a time trend, and cj is a set of club fixed effects.9 The main 
variable of interest, post-2006, is a dummy variable equaling 1 for years 2007 onward and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, uit is an error term. 
Sports researchers understand that there is a large degree of heterogeneity between position players 
and pitchers, particularly since position players potentially play in more games. Therefore, the 2007 CBA 
may have disproportionate effects on these two groups. Equation 3 is estimated separately for position 
players and pitchers. When the sample includes position players, the variables contained in xit include 
experience and experience squared, on-base percentage, slugging percentage, games played, and 
dummy variables for the player’s main position. When the sample contains pitchers, on-base 
percentage, slugging percentage, games played, and position dummies are replaced by earned run 
average and strikeout-to-walk ratio. Those variables contained in zit include the team’s winning 
percentage, real revenue (measured in millions of dollars), and a dummy variable equaling 1 if the team 
is in the National League. 
Results 
Table 1 presents averages of the main variables used in the analysis. The first column shows the 
variables, Column 2 shows the statistics calculated prior to 2007, and the final column contains the 
measures calculated after 2006. There are not many differences in the performance measures of either 
position players or pitchers between the two periods. Players tend to have slightly less experience after 
2006. Additionally, position players have a somewhat lower on-base percentage and slugging 
percentage, and pitchers have a lower earned run average and a higher strikeout-to-walk ratio. Large 
differences between periods do exist when examining average salaries and team revenue. The average 
position player’s salary increases approximately 7.8% between the two periods, whereas average 
pitcher salary increases 11.5% after 2006. Furthermore, average team revenue is 17.9% higher in the 
latter period. The increase in player salaries between periods is not as large as the increase in team 
revenues. Zimbalist (2010) notes how high competitive balance tax rates, in addition to clubs having to 
pay significant minor league player costs, lead to revenues increasing at faster rates when compared to 
player pay in MLB. 
 
 Tables 2 and 3 present results from Equation 3 for position players and pitchers, respectively. The first 
column displays the independent variables used. Columns 2–7 present the regression results based 
upon estimating Equation 3 using different subsamples of the data. The subsamples differ by the player 
observations used (indicated by the row labeled “Sample”). Focusing on Model 1 in Table 2, the 
parameter estimate associated with the post-2006 dummy variable indicates that the 2007 CBA tended 
to increase significantly position player salaries by 19.7%, on average.10 
 
 
 Models 2 and 3 restrict the observations used based upon years of experience. In MLB, players with 
fewer than 3 years of service time are ineligible for either free agency or final offer salary arbitration. 
Those with between 3 and 5 years of service qualify for salary arbitration; however, not all players file 
for arbitration. Players with 6 or more years of service qualify for free agency. The market determines 
salaries received by free agent players. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the 2007 CBA had 
differing effects on players with different years of experience. Model 2 presents results after limiting 
player observations to those with at least 6 years of experience, and Model 3 restricts observations to 
those players with no more than 5 years of service. The 2007 CBA had a relatively larger effect on 
players who qualify for free agency. The 2007 CBA increased salaries for free agent eligible players by 
23% versus 17% for nonfree agent eligibles. While these estimates are not statistically different, they 
represent economically large differences in salary. From 2003 to 2006, the average salary of players with 
at least 6 years of experience is US$2.4 million; the average for those with less than 6 years of 
experience is approximately US$530,000. Using these as a baseline, the parameter estimate in Model 2 
suggests an increase in salary for free agent eligible players equaling US$554,911, and the increase for 
nonfree agent eligible players suggested by Model 3 is US$88,858. 
Models 1–3 include all player-year observations in the estimation. For those players who sign multiyear 
contracts, including all observations, may introduce a nonindependence problem in the estimation.11 To 
try to account for this, Models 4–6 limit the number of observations included for each player. Models 4 
and 5 only include a maximum of two observations per player, the first and the last. Model 5 differs 
from Model 4 in that Model 5 requires that the player’s first observation occurs before 2007, and the 
last observation occurs in 2007 or later. Finally, Model 6 only includes one randomly chosen observation 
per player. In each case, the parameter estimate associated with the post-2006 dummy variable is 
positive, indicating a positive impact from the 2007 CBA on salary. The estimate is statistically significant 
in Models 4 and 5. 
Results in Table 3 for pitchers are slightly different when compared to those for position players.12 
Model 1 indicates that the 2007 CBA increased salaries for pitchers by 8.7%.13 While this is smaller in 
magnitude than the result for position players, the estimates are not statistically different. However, the 
estimate for pitchers is only statistically significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, the results represent 
economically large effects. Using the average salaries for position players and pitchers in the 2003-2006 
period in Table 1 and the coefficients associated with the post-2006 dummy variable from Model 1 in 
Tables 2 and 3, the implied increase in salary for position players equals US$303,353. The implied 
increase for pitchers is US$103,926. In fact, the only result that shows a strongly significant effect of the 
2007 CBA on pitcher salaries is that in Model 2 for free agent eligible players. In whole, the results in 
Table 3 provide only some evidence of the 2007 CBA positively affecting pitcher salaries.14 
Many variables included in Equation 3 exhibit a high degree of collinearity. For example, the correlation 
coefficient between on-base percentage and slugging percentage equals .77. It is possible that 
multicollinearity among the independent variables drives the main results presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
To investigate this, versions of Equation 3 were reestimated using the full set of player observations by 
sequentially adding and subtracting variables. The magnitude of the coefficient associated with the post-
2006 variable remained relatively stable throughout these additional regressions (available upon 
request), which suggests that collinearity among the independent variables does not drive the main 
findings in Tables 2 and 3. 
Using OLS to estimate Equation 3 yields evidence as to how changes made to the 2007 CBA affected the 
conditional mean of the salary distribution. Specifically, the purpose of the modified revenue sharing 
agreement is to allow teams with relatively lower payrolls and revenues to use the additional funds to 
attract, retain, and develop higher quality players to improve competitive balance. Therefore, the 2007 
CBA may have differing effects on players throughout the salary distribution. To this end, the general 
form of Equation 3 was reestimated using quantile regression techniques and the full set of player 
observations. One advantage that quantile regression has over OLS is that outlying observations have a 
smaller influence on estimates of the conditional quantile when compared to the conditional mean, 
which should aid in reducing heteroscedasticity in the distribution. An additional advantage of using 
quantile regression techniques over OLS is that estimating conditional quantiles provides a more 
complete picture of how players throughout the distribution can be affected differentially. The results of 
this estimation are provided in Tables 4 and 5 for position players and pitchers, respectively. 
 
 
 Results in Table 4 for position players suggest that the 2007 CBA’s effect on salaries is not uniform 
throughout the distribution. The parameter estimate associated with the post-2006 variable grows 
when moving from the tails to the center of the distribution, with the largest estimate occurring for 
those players in the 40th percentile. In fact, the coefficient associated with the 90th percentile is not 
statistically significant. Tests were conducted to see whether each coefficient for the other percentiles is 
statistically different from that for the 40th percentile. Results indicate that the coefficient associated 
with the post-2006 variable for the 10th percentile is statistically different at the 5% level, and the 
coefficients associated with the 20th and 90th percentiles are different at the 10% level. This provides 
statistical evidence that the 2007 CBA had a larger effect on position player salaries in the middle of the 
distribution when compared to those in the tails. Given that owners and union representatives must 
agree on changes made to a CBA, these results lend support to the median voter model, suggesting that 
modifications made to the 2007 CBA were designed to aid those position players in the middle of the 
distribution. 
Results in Table 5 suggest a different story for pitchers. As before, the parameter estimates associated 
with the post-2006 dummy variable are relatively smaller at each percentile for pitchers than for 
position players. Additionally, it seems as though the 2007 CBA’s effect on pitcher salaries is 
concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. The coefficient is statistically significant only at the 10th, 
20th, and 30th percentiles, and it is only significant at the 10% level at the 30th percentile. To maintain 
consistency with the analysis for position players, tests were conducted again to see whether each 
coefficient for the other percentiles is statistically different from that for the 40th percentile. Again, the 
results for pitchers are different from those for position players. None of the coefficients associated with 
the post-2006 dummy variable are statistically different from the coefficients for those pitchers at the 
40th percentile. This suggests that while the parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 10th, 
20th, and 30th percentiles, there is no differential effect of the 2007 CBA on pitcher salaries throughout 
the distribution. 
Using the tax rates referenced by Zimbalist (2003) and Maxcy (2009), Equation 2 predicts a player’s 
salary should increase between 15% and 30%. Equation 2 inherently assumes that a player’s quality (or 
relative league quality) remains unchanged between the pre- and post-2006 period. Almost all of the 
results in Tables 2 and 4 for position players lie within the bounds provided by Equation 2. The only 
result that falls outside the bounds occurs in Model 5 of Table 2. However, the sample used in that 
analysis was very restricted (only two observations per player, one before 2007 and one after 2006). The 
results for pitchers, however, do not fall in line with the predictions from Equation 2. Only Models 2 and 
5 in Table 3 show coefficients associated with the post-2006 variable that lie within the predicted 
bounds. 
In MLB, there are clear distinctions between pitchers and position players. The above results suggest 
that uniform regulations within bargaining agreements can have different effects on each group. When 
compared to pitchers, particularly those on a team’s starting rotation, position players generally play in 
significantly more games. Differences in the amount of playing time may lead to differences in the MRP 
between the two types of players. This is not the first article to suggest differential impacts of MLB 
policies on pitchers versus position players. Hill and Spellman (1983) find significantly higher estimated 
increases in compensation for position players versus pitchers due to the introduction of free agency in 
1977. Hill and Jolly (2014) find that position players who file for final offer salary arbitration experience a 
larger increase in salary when compared to pitchers. Furthermore, those position players who exchange 
offers with their teams experience a salary premium, whereas no premium exists for pitchers who 
exchange salary offers with their teams. 
Even though revenue sharing’s effect on salaries is larger, generally, for position players than for 
pitchers, the results in Tables 4 and 5 do suggest a common theme—changes to the revenue sharing 
plan enacted by MLB in the 2007 CBA benefitted mostly players in the middle to lower half of the salary 
distribution in both cases. The 2007 CBAs effect is largest for position players in the 30th–60th 
percentiles, which lends support for the median voter model. For pitchers, the coefficients associated 
with the post-2006 dummy variable are statistically insignificant for the 40th–90th percentiles. As 
mentioned above, there is little evidence of statistically significant differences between the coefficients 
associated with the post-2006 variable across the pitcher quantile regressions. However, these results 
are, qualitatively speaking, in line with the predictions from Equation 2. In other words, those playing for 
smaller revenue/market teams (which typically pay lower salaries, on average) tend to receive larger pay 
increases than those  
Conclusions 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the effect of changes made to the 2007 CBA on player salaries. 
The key change made to the operation of MLB from the 2003 to the 2007 CBAs occurred with the 
revenue sharing agreement. Specifically, the 2007 CBA reduced the marginal tax rate associated with 
revenue sharing and eliminated its regressive nature. Theoretically, these changes should increase 
players’ MRP and, therefore, salary. 
Using a similar methodology to Jewell, McPherson, and Molina (2004), results suggest that the 2007 CBA 
increased position player salaries by 19.7%, on average. The result was relatively robust to various 
sample selection criteria. The 2007 CBA had differential effects on players throughout the distribution, 
however, with the largest impact occurring in the center of the distribution. The impact of the 2007 CBA 
on pitcher salaries is somewhat lower, 8.7% on average. Furthermore, there is little evidence suggesting 
that the effect differs throughout the pitcher salary distribution. 
The change to the revenue sharing agreement in the 2007 CBA represented a dramatic attempt to 
improve competitive balance in MLB. Between 1998 and 1999, the NBA and the National Basketball 
Players Association agreed to similarly large changes to their CBA. Specifically, the NBA and players’ 
union agreed to a cap on individual player salaries, a new exception to the team salary cap, an extension 
of the rookie scale agreement from 3 to 4 years, lower rookie scale salaries, and minimum pay scales 
based upon years of experience.15 Changes to the NBA CBA altered player pay by institutionalizing it 
through maximum payouts and minimum increases. The MLB CBA changed revenue sharing between 
franchises in the hopes of incentivizing teams to invest in players and, therefore, change salaries. The 
MLBPA has steadfastly resisted any owner overtures for team- or individual-level salary caps. Because of 
this resistance, baseball has the most market-driven salaries of the four major professional team-based 
sports in the United States. Comparing MLB to the NBA allows for an understanding as to how different 
unions trying to reach a compromise in collective bargaining negotiations can affect salaries. 
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Notes 
1.The panel’s independent members included Paul Volcker, George Will, Richard Levin, and George J. 
Mitchell. The Panel’s report can be found at 
http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf. 
2.For an example focusing on final offer salary arbitration, see Hill and Jolly (2014). 
3.See Basic Agreement (2002), Zimbalist (2003, 2006), and Maxcy (2009) for more specific details. 
4.See “Pirates’ books reveal flaw in revenue-sharing” by Rob Biertempfel and Bob Cohn (2010) or “MLBs 
Revenue-Sharing Formula” by David Jacobson (2008). 
5.See Basic Agreement (2006) and Zimbalist (2006) for more detail. 
6.This result assumes that the relative quality of the player is the same in the period before and after 
the change in the tax rate. 
7.The Uniform Resource Locator (URL) for the USA Today Web site is 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/salaries/index.htm. The URL for Doug’s statistics is 
http://www.dougstats.com. The URL for Rodney Fort’s database is 
https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes. 
8.Jewell, McPherson, and Molina (2004) use a similar estimated equation. The authors estimate the 
determinants of within-team Gini coefficients throughout the 1990s. Since this article is 
interested in salaries throughout the league, instead of at the team level, the analysis uses a 
similar estimated equation for individual player salaries. 
9.The salary figures do not include any incentive bonuses earned. 
10.The exact percentage change comes from e β ˆ  −1 eβ^−1 . 
11.It is worth noting that the standard errors in Models 1—3 are robust and clustered at the  player 
level. This should account for some of this nonindependence. 
12.The parameter estimate associated with the National League (NL) dummy variable warrants some 
discussion. For position players, the results of Model 1 in Table 2 suggest that NL position 
players earn approximately 15% less than comparable American League (AL) position players do. 
Simple averages from the data support this claim. Position players in the AL earned, on average, 
US$1,744,779. Players in the NL earned US$1,480,632, which is approximately 15% less. The 
coefficient associated with the NL dummy variable in the pitcher regression (Model 1 in Table 3), 
however, is misleading. The coefficient indicates that NL pitchers earn 36% less than AL pitchers 
do. This is due to multicollinearity in the pitcher regressions. The NL dummy variable is highly 
correlated with the team fixed effects. When removing the team dummies and reestimating 
Equation 3 for pitchers, the coefficient associated with the NL dummy variable equals −0.034, 
and it is statistically insignificant. This implies that NL pitchers earn approximately 3.3% less than 
AL pitchers do, on average. Simple averages from the data set support this number. The average 
AL pitcher salary equals US$1,288,251, and the average NL pitcher salary is US$1,270,779, which 
is 1.4% lower. 
13.It is possible that changes to the revenue sharing plan in the 2007 CBA affected not only pay on 
average but also the return to various performance metrics, such as slugging percentage for 
position players or earned run average for pitchers. To investigate this, interaction terms 
between the post-2006 dummy variable and each variable in xit were created. These interactions 
were then used in Equation 3 for both position players and pitchers. Results from these 
regressions show that the coefficients associated with the post-2006 dummy variable and each 
of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant. Therefore, it appears that the revenue 
sharing agreement in the 2007 CBA had only a level effect on log salary and did not affect the 
returns to each of the performance metrics used here. 
14.Team owners and MLBPA representatives did agree to other changes between the 2003 and 2007 
CBAs, and these may have affected players’ salaries. It is important to note that the post-2006 
variable may pick up these other changes. However, most of the alterations to the 2007 CBA 
were minor when compared to the changes made to revenue sharing. One potential example is 
the change made to the competitive balance tax. The competitive balance tax rates did not 
change from the 2003 to the 2007 CBAs. However, the 2003 CBA provided some exceptions 
allowing teams to have payrolls exceed the payroll threshold and pay no tax. The 2007 CBA 
eliminated these tax loopholes. All teams are affected by changes made to the revenue sharing 
agreement, while only four teams were subject to the competitive balance tax during the 
sample period here. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the revenue sharing agreement 
had a larger effect on teams than did the changes to the competitive balance tax. Arguably, 
while only four teams explicitly paid the competitive balance tax, removing tax loopholes could 
raise the implicit competitive balance tax rate. Theoretical models developed by Fort and Quirk 
(1995) and Marburger (1997) show that increases in the implicit tax rate associated with the 
competitive balance tax should reduce players’ MRP and, therefore, salaries. The post-2006 
variable would pick up this effect. The results presented here generally show an increase in 
salary associated with the 2007 CBA. This provides evidence that the changes made to the 
revenue sharing agreement had a relatively larger effect on salaries when compared to the 
competitive balance tax. 
15.For a detailed discussion of the various changes made to the NBA CBA, see Hill and Jolly (2012). 
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